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We investigate the connection between the optimal collective eavesdropping attack and the opti-
mal cloning attack where the eavesdropper employs an optimal cloner to attack the quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol. The analysis is done in the context of the security proof in Refs. [1, 2]
for discrete variable protocols in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces. We consider a scenario in which
the protocols and cloners are equipped with symmetries. These symmetries are used to define a
quantum cloning scenario. We find that, in general, it does not hold that the optimal attack is an
optimal cloner. However, there are classes of protocols, where we can identify an optimal attack by
an optimal cloner. We analyze protocols with 2, d and d + 1 mutually unbiased bases where d is
a prime, and show that for the protocols with 2 and d+ 1 MUBs the optimal attack is an optimal
cloner, but for the protocols with d MUBs, it is not 1. Finally, we give criteria to identify protocols
which have different signal states, but the same optimal attack. Using these criteria, we present
qubit protocols which have the same optimal attack as the BB84 protocol or the 6-state protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to
establish a secret key between two legitimate parties (Al-
ice and Bob), that is unknown to an eavesdropper (Eve).
The secret key can be used later in cryptographic appli-
cations, for example to facilitate secure communication.
To start a QKD protocol Alice prepares quantum
states (signal states) and sends them through a quantum
channel to Bob, who performs measurements on them.
These type of protocols are referred to as prepare-and-
measure protocols and result in quantum mechanically
correlated classical data being shared between Alice and
Bob. They can extract a secret key from this data us-
ing classical communication protocols. For this to suc-
ceed, Alice and Bob need to be able to upper bound
the amount of information Eve can gain on the corre-
lated data. This information comes from an interaction
of Eve with the signals. For any such attack, there is a
trade-off between the amount of information that leaks
to Eve and the amount of disturbance that she causes
to the signal states. From the observation of this distur-
bance, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve’s information on
the data and perform suitable communication protocols
to distill secret keys form their data on which Eve has no
information.
In this paper, we deal with the problem of finding the
optimal interaction between Eve and the signals. Our
approach to the security analysis is to restrict Eve to
collective attacks [1, 2] in which she interacts with each
signal separately as the range of the validity of this attack
can be shown to extend to the most general attack (see
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section III). A collective attack is completely determined
by a unitary interaction UE between the signal states and
some additional ancilla states held by Eve. The optimal
attack which gives the highest amount of information to
Eve (by some suitable measure) for a given amount of
disturbance is denoted by UoptE .
One specific type of interaction is an optimal quantum
cloner [3]. An optimal cloner is a unitary transforma-
tion UoptC that acts on the signal states and some ancilla
states, with the objective of producing two copies of the
signal states. The optimal cloner has the property that
the copies emerge with the highest fidelity (with respect
to the original signal states) allowed by quantum mechan-
ics. An optimal cloner is called symmetric if the fidelities
of the two copies are the same, and asymmetric if the
fidelities are different. Consider now the following eaves-
dropping attack: Eve uses an optimal asymmetric cloner
to copy the signal states sent by Alice, forwards one copy
to Bob, and keeps the other copy for herself. She choses
the optimal cloner in such a way that the fidelity of Bob’s
copy is in agreement with Bob’s measurement outcomes.
In [4–6], such cloning attacks were used to model Eve’s
attack, but optimality was only conjectured. Indeed, for
some protocols (e.g. the BB84 [7] or the 6-state protocol
[8]), the optimal attack is known to be an optimal cloner,
but in general the relationship between optimal cloning
and optimal eavesdropping is unknown.
The goal of the present work is to establish the connec-
tion between optimal eavesdropping on QKD protocols
and optimal cloning in the context of the security defi-
nition in Refs. [1, 2] for protocols with direct, one-way
reconciliation. We consider protocols with symmetries
so that, without loss of generality, the optimal attack is
found in a set with a corresponding symmetry. In this
scenario, it turns out that a necessary condition for an
optimal cloner to be a candidate for an optimal attack
is the strong covariance condition [9]. This condition en-
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2sures that the optimal cloner and the optimal attack are
drawn from the same set, and that the optimal cloner
uses the same number of ancilla states as the optimal
eavesdropping attack. If strong covariance does not hold
for the optimal cloner defined by the signal states of the
QKD protocol, we can already conclude that the optimal
attack on the QKD protocol is not an optimal cloner.
In this paper, we calculate the optimal attack for qubit-
based protocols (e.g. the BB84 and the 6-state protocol)
and for protocols in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces using
mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) (e.g. protocols with
2 MUBs, d+1 MUBs [4] or d MUBs) and compare the
results to the optimal cloner. The security of these pro-
tocols has been studied previously in Refs. [4, 6, 8, 10–
12]. In Ref. [13], in particular, the security was proven
for protocols with 2 and d + 1 MUBs using the security
proof methods of Refs. [1, 2].
Additionally, we observe that some groups of QKD
protocols that share some common symmetry features
can be proven to have the same optimal attack, despite
having different sets of signal states. As an example, we
present qubit protocols which have the same optimal at-
tack as the BB84 protocol or the 6-state protocol, and we
give criteria to identify protocols with the same optimal
attack.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we
describe prepare-and-measure protocols using a thought
set-up that includes entangled states and is referred to as
the source-replacement scheme. In section III we summa-
rize the security proofs given in Refs. [1, 2]. In section
IV, we provide two theorems about the convexity and
concavity properties, as well as a lemma about the in-
variance property of the classical mutual information and
the Holevo quantity. In section V we describe protocols
with a symmetry in the signal states. Under the assump-
tion that Alice and Bob use only averaged measurement
quantities, and that the classical post processing respects
certain symmetry properties, we show that the symme-
tries of the signal states can be transfered to Eve’s inter-
action. This holds true in particular for the class of pro-
tocols where the signal states are composed of complete
sets of basis states, and where Alice and Bob discard data
where they disagree on the basis after the measurement.
The formalism of quantum cloners is summarized in sec-
tion VI along the lines of Ref. [9]. The main statement
of section VII is that the optimal cloner must be strong
covariant in order to be an optimal attack. However,
strong covariance alone does not yet uniquely determine
if the optimal attack is an optimal cloner. We summa-
rize the features of the class of protocol where the signal
states are invariant under the generalized Pauli group,
for which the corresponding cloning attack is known to
be strong covariant. In section VIII we give examples of
protocols which use the mutually unbiased eigenbases of
the generalized Pauli operators and analyze the relation
between the optimal attack and the optimal cloner. In
section IX we provide a theorem for the class of proto-
cols with complete sets of basis states and basis sifting,
which allows us to determine when the optimal attacks
of different protocols in this class are the same. Finally,
we draw conclusions in section X.
II. SOURCE-REPLACEMENT SCHEME
A typical QKD protocol consists of a quantum and
a classical phase. In the quantum phase, Alice chooses
signal states |ϕx〉 from a set S with probability p(x) de-
fined on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. She sends the
signal states through a quantum channel to Bob, who
performs measurements on them by means of a positive
operator valued measures (POVM) MB = {By}, result-
ing in a joint probability distribution p(x, y). This sig-
nal preparation scheme is typically called prepare-and-
measure scheme. In the classical phase, Alice and Bob
perform error correction and privacy amplification, in or-
der extract a secret key from their measurement data.
The security proof of a protocol is more conveniently
described in the source-replacement scheme, which is
equivalent to the prepare-and-measure scheme. The
source-replacement scheme is a thought set-up, in which
Alice creates the bipartite entangled state (source state)
|Φ〉 =
∑
x
√
p(x)|x〉X |ϕx〉S (1)
in her lab, keeps the first half for herself and sends the
other half to Bob. The states |x〉 form an orthonormal
basis X = {|x〉, x = 0, ..., |S| − 1} of an |S|-dimensional
Hilbert space HX . In order to prepare the state |ϕx〉 at
Bob’s side, Alice performs a projective measurement in
the basis X , which triggers the source state to collapse
onto the conditional state |ϕx〉 with probability p(x).
If the signal states are linearly dependent, we can
rewrite the source state in a more compact form using
the Schmidt decomposition of pure states. For this pur-
pose, we define a d-dimensional subsystem HA of HX ,
and express the source state on the “compressed” space
HA ⊗HS
|Φ〉AS =
d−1∑
i=0
√
κi |¯i〉A|i〉S . (2)
In this expression the Schmidt basis B = {|i〉S ; i =
0, ..., d − 1} of system S and the Schmidt coefficients√
κi are defined as the eigenbasis and the square
roots of the eigenvalues of the reduced operator φS =
trX{|Φ〉XS〈Φ|}. The Schmidt basis A = {|¯i〉A; i =
0, ..., d − 1} of system A can be explicitly given by the
orthonormal vectors |¯i〉 = ∑x√p(x)α(x)i |x〉/√κi, where
the α
(x)
i = 〈i|ϕx〉 are the coefficients of the signal states
in the Schmidt basis B. In the following, we omit the bar
in |¯i〉 for simplicity.
Furthermore, Alice’s von Neumann measurement in
the basis X on the larger space HX is the Naimark ex-
tension of a measurement MA = {Ax} with respect to
3rank-one POVM elements Ax on the smaller space HA
given by
Ax = p(x)
√
ρA
−1|ϕ∗x〉〈ϕ∗x|
√
ρA
−1
. (3)
Here we define the density matrix of Alice’s reduced state
as
ρA = trS{|Φ〉AS〈Φ|}, (4)
and the states
|ϕ∗x〉 =
∑
i
|i〉〈ϕx|i〉 =
∑
i
|i〉 (α(x)i )∗, (5)
where the symbol ∗ denotes the complex conjugate with
respect to the Schmidt basis A. The operators Ax are
positive, sum up to the identity, and satisfy the property
trA{Ax ⊗ 1|Φ〉〈Φ|} = p(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|.
After Eve’s interaction with the signal states, but prior
to Alice and Bob’s measurements, the state held by Al-
ice and Bob is described by an unknown (mixed) state
ρAB instead of a perfect copy of the source state. Nev-
ertheless, Alice and Bob have some information about
ρAB due to their measurements. They can constrain the
form of ρAB from the probability distribution of their
measurement outcomes
p(x, y) = tr{Ax ⊗By ρAB} (6)
in a process called parameter estimation. In addition,
Alice and Bob know that Alice’s reduced density ma-
trix of ρAB remains unchanged, as already anticipated
in equation (4), because the system A never leaves Al-
ice’s lab (see Fig. 1). However, unless Alice and Bob’s
measurements are sufficient to obtain a tomographically
complete parametrization of ρAB , there could be many
states ρAB that are compatible with p(x, y) and ρA. For
what follows, it is useful to make the following definition
Definition 1 The set Γ contains all bipartite states
ρAB that are compatible with the measurement outcomes
p(x, y) and that have a given reduced state ρA.
In the source-replacement scheme Eve attaches ancil-
las (defined on the system E) to the second half of the
source state |Φ〉AS followed by a unitary transformation
UE which takes the composite system SE to BE. She
then keeps the transformed ancillas for herself, and re-
sends the remaining system B to Bob (see Fig. 1). The
mixed state ρAB is the result of Eve’s interaction with the
signal states. Eve’s unitary transformation UE is equiv-
alently characterized by the purification |Ψ〉ABE of ρAB
on the dilated space HABE , where the dimension of the
purifying system E is the same as the dimension of AB.
In order to guarantee unconditional security of the pro-
tocol, we must assume that Eve can exploit everything
allowed by quantum mechanics for her attack, which is
realized by giving her full control over |Ψ〉ABE .
Alice Bob
|Φ〉Source
A S B
E EUE
Eve
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FIG. 1: In the source-replacement scheme, Alice prepares
the entangled state |Φ〉. The system A is kept by Alice, while
the system S is sent through the quantum channel to Bob.
Eve attaches ancillas to the signal states and performs a uni-
tary transformation on the joint system SE, transforming it
to BE. She resends the system B to Bob. After Eve’s interac-
tion, Alice and Bob no longer share a perfect copy of |Φ〉, but
a bipartite state ρAB , which is only partially characterized by
their observations.
Note that to each ρAB an entire class of purifications
|Ψ〉WABE = 1AB ⊗WE |Ψ〉ABE can be constructed, where
W is local unitary transformation on Eve’s system. In
what follows such local transformations on Eve’s system
are irrelevant.
III. KEY RATE
The security proof presented in Refs. [1, 2, 14] provides
a bound on the rate at which Alice and Bob can extract
a secret key. The proof is valid for collective attacks and
for one-way classical communication. In many cases the
proof can also be extended to hold for coherent attacks
and two-way communication [15, 16].
Given Alice, Bob and Eve share the purification |Ψ〉 of
the state ρAB . After Alice and Bob measure their sys-
tems with respect to Ax and By, they share the tripartite
classical-classical-quantum (ccq) state [1]
ρXYE =
∑
x,y
p(x, y)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ ρxyE (7)
where |x〉 and |y〉 are two sets of orthonormal bases, and
ρxyE = trAB{Ax⊗By⊗1E |Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x, y) are Eve’s quan-
tum states conditioned on the event that Alice and Bob’s
outcomes were x and y.
Using error correction and privacy amplification, Alice
and Bob extract a secret key from the ccq state ρXYE . A
typical choice for the error correction is one-way reconcil-
iation, in which the data of one party is set as a reference
for the key, and the other party must correct her or his
noisy data to match the reference. For our purposes, we
will consider protocols with direct reconciliation, that is,
Alice’s data serves as the reference key and Bob corrects
his data accordingly. The rate, established in [1, 2, 14],
at which an unconditionally secure key against collective
4attacks can be extracted is given by
r(ρXYE) = I(X : Y )− χ(X : E), (8)
where I(X : Y ) = H(X) + H(Y )−H(X,Y ) is the clas-
sical mutual information of Alice and Bob’s data, and
χ(X : E) = H(X) +S(E)−S(X,E) is the Holevo quan-
tity or quantum mutual information between Alice and
Eve. H and S denote the Shannon entropy and the von
Neumann entropy, respectively. The Holevo quantity is
explicitly given by
χ(X : E) = S(ρE)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxE). (9)
where ρxE is Eve’s state conditioned on Alice’s value x
and ρE =
∑
x p(x)ρ
x
E is Eve’s reduced state. For the
practical calculation of the Holevo quantity, an explicit
reference to the system E can be eliminated, because the
entropies S(ρE) and S(ρ
x
E) can be expressed in terms
of quantities on the systems AB: If the state |Ψ〉 is
pure, then S(ρAB) = S(ρE). If, furthermore, Alice uses
rank-one POVM elements, then the conditional states
ρxBE = trA{Ax ⊗ 1BE |Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x) are pure, and there-
fore S(ρxE) = S(ρ
x
B). In this situation, the Holevo quan-
tity simplifies to
χ(X : E) = S(ρAB)−
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxB). (10)
Usually, the key is not directly extracted from the state
ρXYE , because the data p(x, y) might be only weakly
correlated. Alice and Bob typically postselect on highly
correlated data before proceeding with the protocol. For
example, Alice and Bob might ignore events which they
measured in different bases - so called basis sifting - or
they might discard data, where Bob did not record a de-
tection event. Effectively, the key is extracted from a
postselected state E(ρAB), which has again two classi-
cal registers XY on Alice and Bob’s side and a quantum
register E on Eve’s side, but also additional classical reg-
isters carrying the information about the communication
(announcements) between Alice and Bob that arise dur-
ing the postselection.
Here we give a short description of the postselection
that leads to E(ρAB). For a more detailed formalism see
appendix A: Alice and Bob announce some information
about each signal to the public, that typically does not
reveal any direct knowledge about the secret key. In the
case of the sifting process, for example, they announce
their basis choices. Depending on the announcement,
the signal is either kept or discarded. Let us denote the
announcements of the kept signals by u. On the level of
the quantum state ρAB , the measurement with respect
to MA and MB followed by the announcement and the
discarding is equivalently described by first a filtering
operation on ρAB followed by new measurements. The
filtering yields transformed states ρuAB depending on the
announcement u. The state held by Alice and Bob before
the new measurement is then a convex combination of
states ρuAB over the classical subsets u with probability
p(u)
ρ =
∑
u
p(u)ρuAB ⊗ |u〉〈u|. (11)
The new measurement is then performed on each ρuAB
independently. In order to preserve the probability dis-
tributions of the measurement outcomes, we identify new
pairs of POVMs MuA and M
u
B conditioned on the an-
nouncement u. By giving to Eve the purification of each
ρuAB , we obtain new ccq states ρ
u
XY E for each announce-
ment u after the measurement with respect to MuA and
MuB . The effective state E(ρAB) after the post-selection
is then described by the convex combination
E(ρAB) =
∑
u
p(u)ρuXY E ⊗ |u〉〈u|. (12)
If we choose to extract the key from each ρuXY E inde-
pendently, the effective key rate is given by
r¯(E(ρAB)) =
∑
u
p(u)r(ρuXY E), (13)
where r is the key rate given in equation (8). Other
choices of key extraction may combine different outcomes
into one stream, but here we choose to analyze the sim-
pler case of separate processing.
By defining the total Holevo quantity and the total
mutual information by
χ¯(E(ρAB)) :=
∑
u
p(u)χu(X : E), (14)
I¯(E(ρAB)) :=
∑
u
p(u)Iu(X : Y ), (15)
where χu(X : E) and Iu(X : Y ) are the Holevo quantity
and the mutual information of the state ρuXY E , we can
rewrite the effective key rate as
r¯(E(ρAB)) = I¯(E(ρAB))− χ¯(E(ρAB)). (16)
If Alice and Bob knew Eve’s attack strategy, the calcu-
lation of the key rate would be straightforward. However,
all Alice and Bob know is that they share a state ρAB
from the set Γ in Def. 1. Therefore, Eve has the freedom
to chose any attack, as long as it creates a state ρAB that
is compatible with Γ. Among all these possible attacks,
the one that generates the lowest key rate
rmin = inf
ρAB∈Γ
r¯(E(ρAB)) (17)
is defined as the optimal attack. We call the pure state
corresponding to the optimal attack |Ψ〉opt with the re-
duced state ρoptAB . If Alice and Bob want to guarantee
that their protocol is secure, they must assume that Eve
performed the optimal attack. Hence, they cannot gen-
erate a secret key at a rate higher than rmin for the given
protocol.
5IV. PROPERTIES OF THE MUTUAL
INFORMATION AND THE HOLEVO QUANTITY
In this section we give three properties of the classical
mutual information and the Holevo quantity.
At first, we introduce a new notation for the mutual
information and the Holevo quantity, that is more conve-
nient for our purposes throughout the rest of this paper.
Let Alice and Bob share a quantum state ρAB , which they
measure with respect to the POVM MAB = {Ax ⊗ By :
Ax ∈MA, By ∈MB}. We always assume that Eve holds
the purification |Ψ〉 of ρAB . Instead of denoting I(X : Y )
with the dependence on the registers XY , we denote the
mutual information by
I(ρAB ,MAB) := I(X : Y ). (18)
By specifying the quantum state ρAB and the POVM
MAB , the measured state on the registers XY is entirely
defined. On the other hand, the Holevo quantity can be
directly calculated from the cq-state ρXE that emerges
after Alice’s measurement of |Ψ〉 and after tracing over
Bob’s system. We write
χ(ρAB ,MA) := χ(X : E) (19)
for the Holevo quantity implying that there is a step from
ρAB to |Ψ〉.
In the first theorem of this section we show that the
classical mutual information I(ρAB ,MAB) is convex over
ρAB with fixed probability distribution p(x) = tr{AxρA}.
We call this feature “weak convexity” to indicate that
convexity only holds with the restriction on p(x).
Theorem 1 (Weak convexity). Given the states
ρAB, σAB and the convex sum ρ¯AB = λρAB+(1−λ)σAB
for λ ∈ [0, 1] with probability distributions p(x, y) =
tr{Ax ⊗ By ρAB}, q(x, y) = tr{Ax ⊗ By σAB} and
p¯(x, y) = λp(x, y) + (1− λ)q(x, y). If the probability dis-
tributions satisfy p(x) = q(x) for all x, then the mutual
information is convex in the sense that
I(ρ¯AB ,MAB) ≤ λI(ρAB ,MAB) + (1− λ)I(σAB ,MAB).
(20)
The proof of this theorem is given in appendix B.
Second, we show that the Holevo quantity χ(ρAB ,MA)
is concave as a function of ρAB .
Theorem 2 (Concavity). Given the states ρAB, σAB
and the convex sum ρ¯AB = λρAB + (1 − λ)σAB for
λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the Holevo is concave, meaning that
it satisfies the property
χ(ρ¯AB ,MA) ≥ λχ(ρAB ,MA) + (1− λ)χ(σAB ,MA).
(21)
The proof of this theorem is in appendix C.
Since we use postselection in our protocols, we need to
extend these theorems to hold for the key rate r¯(E(ρAB))
in the following sense
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)) ≤ λr¯(E(ρAB)) + (1− λ)r¯(E(σAB)). (22)
This property (22) does not hold in general. For exam-
ple, under certain postselection strategies, the restriction
p(x) = q(x) in theorem 1 may be violated. We will show
later that for sifting on orthogonal basis states, the con-
vexity property (22) holds.
Third, we show how I(ρAB ,MAB) and χ(ρAB ,MA)
change under unitary transformations of the input state
ρAB .
Lemma 1 Given the states ρAB and σAB = U ⊗
V ρABU
† ⊗ V †. The mutual information and the Holevo
quantity transform as follows:
I(σAB ,MAB) = I(ρAB , U
† ⊗ V †MABU ⊗ V ) (23)
χ(σAB ,MA) = χ(ρAB , U
†MAU) (24)
where we define the sets
U†MAU := {U†AxU} (25)
V †MBV := {V †ByV } (26)
and the set
U† ⊗ V † MAB U ⊗ V := {U† ⊗ V †(Ax ⊗By) U ⊗ V }.
(27)
The proof of this lemma is based on the cyclic property of
the trace, and that the von Neumann entropy is unitarily
invariant: S(UρU†) = S(ρ).
This lemma will prove useful in the next section, where
we identify U and V with the unitary representations of
the symmetry groups governing Ax and By.
V. SYMMETRIES IN PROTOCOLS
In this section we introduce a scenario, in which the set
Γ can be reduced to a set Γ¯, which contains only states
with a certain symmetry corresponding to the symme-
tries of the signal states.
A. Symmetries of the signal states and
measurements
Let G be a group with a unitary representation
{Ug; g ∈ G}. A set of states S is G-invariant, if for all
states |ϕx〉 ∈ S and all g ∈ G the state
|ϕg(x)〉〈ϕg(x)| := Ug|ϕx〉〈ϕx|U†g (28)
is also in S. Here the index g(x) denotes the index of the
state Ug|ϕx〉. The following lemma describes the symme-
try properties of the POVM elements Ax and the reduced
state ρA in the source replacement picture (3, 4):
Lemma 2 If the initial probability distribution p(x) is
uniform (p(x) = 1/|S| for all x) and the signal states are
6G-invariant, then the set of POVM elements Ax and the
reduced state ρA are G
∗-invariant, namely
U∗gAxU
T
g = Ag(x), (29)
U∗g ρAU
T
g = ρA. (30)
The symbols ∗ and T denote the complex conjugate and
the transpose with respect to the fixed Schmidt basis B.
We prove lemma 2 in appendix D. Note that, with
our particular definition of ∗ and T with respect to the
Schmidt basis, the operators U∗g and U
T
g are well-defined.
In the following, we consider only protocols in which
Bob’s measurement operators By are equipped with the
G-invariance
UgByU
†
g = Bg(y). (31)
B. Parameter estimation with symmetries
The symmetries in the signal states alone do not guar-
antee that the optimal eavesdropping attack is symmet-
ric. Moreover, the observations and the post processing
of the measured data also need to satisfy certain symme-
try criteria.
In many protocols only averaged measurement quanti-
ties are kept for the parameter estimation. For example,
often only the quantum bit error rate (QBER) averaged
over all the signal states is monitored. In this section,
and for the rest of this paper, we consider the scenario
where Alice and Bob only keep averaged measurement
quantities, and where the initial probability distribution
p(x) = 1/|S| of the signals is uniform. In this scenario,
Alice and Bob calculate a linear function Q of the prob-
ability distribution p(x, y) with the invariance property
Q[p(x, y)] = Q[p(g(x), g(y))] ∀g ∈ G. (32)
where the distribution
p(g(x), g(y)) = tr{Ag(x) ⊗Bg(x)ρAB} (33)
is generated by relabeling the POVM elements Ax ⊗ By
by Ag(x) ⊗ Bg(y). Later on, we will identify Q with the
average error rate.
From now on, Alice and Bob’s knowledge about ρAB
is solely described by the average quantity Q instead of
the more detailed distribution p(x, y). In the previous
section the set of all states that are compatible with the
measurement data was the set Γ in Def. 1. Now, since the
average quantity Q is a coarse-grained version of p(x, y),
the set of states which are compatible with Q, Γave, is a
superset of Γ, containing all states of the form
ρ
(Ug)
AB = U
∗
g ⊗ UgρAB(U∗g ⊗ Ug)† ∀g ∈ G, (34)
where ρAB ∈ Γ. The states ρ(Ug)AB have the properties that
(i) they are compatible with Q, and (ii) their reduced
state trB{ρ(Ug)AB } is equal to ρA.
Weak convexity of r
Γ
Γave
Γ¯
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FIG. 2: By only using averaged measurement quantities Q
for parameter estimation, the set Γ is replaced by a bigger set
Γave. Using the weak convexity of the key rate, the optimal
attack can be chosen from a symmetrized set Γ¯.
Let us now define a map that takes a bipartite state
ρAB and “symmetrizes” it with respect to the group G
by averaging over all the ρ
(Ug)
AB . In the literature this map
is commonly known as twirling,
T G[ρAB ] ≡ ρ¯AB = 1|G|
∑
g∈G
ρ
(Ug)
AB , (35)
where |G| is the number of group elements in G. Due to
the linearity of Q, Γave also contains all the states ρ¯AB .
The twirling map T G maps the set Γave to a subset, Γ¯,
which contains only states of the form ρ¯AB . Each ρ¯AB
has the property that it commutes with all U∗g ⊗ Ug,[
ρ¯AB , U
∗
g ⊗ Ug
]
= 0 ∀g ∈ G. (36)
The purification of a twirled state ρ¯AB can be chosen to
satisfies the following invariance:
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug ⊗ U∗g |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 ∀g ∈ G. (37)
The existence of this particular choice of the purification
has been proven in Ref. [17] for permutation groups, but
the same proof holds for arbitrary groups as well.
C. Symmetric attack
One can restrict the search for the optimal attack ρoptAB
to a search over the set Γ¯, provided that the key rate of
the particular protocol satisfies the convexity property,
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)) ≤ 1|G|
∑
g∈G
r¯(E(ρ(Ug)AB )), (38)
and the invariance property,
r¯(E(ρAB)) = r¯(E(ρ(Ug)AB )), (39)
under the corresponding symmetry group G. In this sit-
uation, ρoptAB results from a symmetric attack and must
lie in the subset Γ¯ ⊂ Γave with the key rate given by
rmin = inf
ρ¯AB∈Γ¯
r¯(E(ρ¯AB)). (40)
7In Fig. 2 we represent schematically the transition
from Γ to Γ¯. The symmetrized states ρ¯AB are easily
characterized using tools from representation theory. In
appendix E, we show how to obtain ρ¯AB using Schur’s
lemma.
In summary, in order to evaluate the key rate over the
symmetrized set Γ¯, the protocol needs to exhibit suffi-
cient symmetries, both in the quantum phase and in the
classical phase:
1. Symmetries in quantum phase: the set of signal
states S and Bob’s POVM elements By are G-
invariant, and the a priori probability distribution
p(x) is uniform.
2. Coarse-grained parameter estimation: Alice and
Bob restrict themselves to averaged measurement
quantities Q in the parameter estimation.
3. Convexity and invariance of the key rate: the key
rate r¯(E(ρAB)) satisfies
(a) convexity r¯(E(ρ¯AB)) ≤ 1|G|
∑
g∈G r¯(E(ρ(Ug)AB )),
(b) invariance r¯(E(ρAB)) = r¯(E(ρ(Ug)AB )).
In particular, the convexity and invariance properties de-
pend strongly on the postselection procedure and must
be checked for each protocol independently.
D. Examples of protocols with symmetric optimal
attack: orthogonal bases as signal states
Let us now construct a class of protocols where the
set of signal states contains only complete sets of basis
states, and where Alice and Bob postselect on events they
measured in the same basis. This postselection is com-
monly referred to as sifting. We will show for this class
of protocols that the convexity (38) and invariance (39)
of the key rate always holds. Therefore, by choosing to
keep only the average error rate Q (defined below) for
the parameter estimation, the optimal attack can always
be assumed to be symmetric.
First, we define the signal states and the measure-
ments. Let us denote a basis of a d-dimensional Hilbert
space by Bβ = {|ϕ(β,k)〉 : k = 0, ..., d− 1}, where β is the
basis index. Note that, in the following the states |ϕ(β,k)〉
carry two independent indices (β, k) instead of only one.
The set of signal states of each protocol is then identified
by
SL = {Bβ : β ∈ L}, (41)
where L is the set from which the bases β are drawn. For
each protocol the set L is fixed and contains |L| elements.
If each signal state |ϕ(β,k)〉 is chosen with equal a priori
probability p(β, k) = 1/(d · |L|), Alice’s reduced state ρA
in equation (4) is proportional to the identity ρA = 1/d.
Therefore, Alice’s POVM elements in equation (3) reduce
to the projectors
A(β,k) =
1
|L| |ϕ
∗
(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)| (42)
with |ϕ∗(β,k)〉 =
∑
i |i〉〈ϕ(β,k)|i〉 defined in equation (5).
Furthermore, we construct Bob’s POVMs to be isomor-
phic to Alice’s:
B(β,k) =
1
|L| |ϕ(β,k)〉〈ϕ(β,k)|. (43)
Second, Alice and Bob postselect on those measure-
ment outcomes, which they performed in the same basis.
In this particular case, Alice and Bob’s announcement u
is the basis β.
We show three properties in appendix F for these pro-
tocols under post selection, which we will use to prove
the convexity and the invariance of the effective key rate
r¯(E(ρAB)): (i) The measurements conditioned on u are
simply renormalized versions of the original POVMs:
MuA = {|L| A(β,k) : β = u} (44)
MuB = {|L| B(β,k) : β = u}, (45)
(ii) the filtered states are independent of u and satisfy
ρuAB = ρAB , and (iii) the probability distribution p(u) =
1
|L| is uniform. Additionally, since ρA = 1/d and the M
u
A
is a von Neumann measurement, the marginals pu(x) :=
tr{|ϕ∗(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)|ρA} = 1d are uniform.
Using the uniform marginals pu(x) in combination with
theorem 1, each term I(ρAB ,M
u
AB) is convex in ρAB .
Moreover, due to the uniform distribution of p(u), the
convexity property immediately transfers to the convex
sum
I¯(E(ρAB)) = 1|L|
∑
u
I(ρAB ,M
u
AB) (46)
Similarly, from theorem 2 we conclude that each term
χ(ρ¯AB ,M
u
A) is concave in ρAB , which transfers also to
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = 1|L|
∑
u
χ(ρAB ,M
u
A) (47)
by the same argument. The convexity of the effective
key rate r¯(E(ρAB)) now follows immediately form the
definition in equation (16).
Next, we show the invariance of r¯(E(ρAB)) under the
symmetry group G. Since any unitary acts like a basis
transformation, the sets MuA and M
u
B effectively inherit
the G∗- and G-invariance from the individual POVM el-
ements A(β,k) and B(β,k). More precisely, the sets
M
g(u)
A := U
∗
gM
u
AU
T
g , (48)
M
g(u)
B := UgM
u
BU
†
g , (49)
are again POVMs corresponding to the announcement
with index g(u) in the protocol.
8Using the definitions (48) and (49), and applying
lemma 1, each component of r¯(E(ρAB)) transforms as
follows under unitaries:
I(ρ
(Ug)
AB ,M
g(u)
AB ) = I(ρAB ,M
u
AB) (50)
χ(ρ
(Ug)
AB ,M
g(u)
A ) = χ(ρAB ,M
u
A). (51)
Due to the uniform distribution of p(u) and the G∗- and
G-invariance of the POVMs, the invariance property of
the convex sums I¯(E(ρAB)) and χ¯(E(ρAB)) as well as
r¯(E(ρAB)) follows directly.
In summary, if the average error rateQ in definition 2 is
used in the parameter estimation, the optimal attack lies
in the symmetric subset Γ¯ for this class of protocols, and
the key rate rmin can be calculated according to equation
(40) without loss of generality.
Definition 2 The average error rate is the probability
that Alice sent the signal state |ϕ(β,k)〉, but Bob received
an orthogonal state |ϕ(β,k′)〉 (k′ 6= k), averaged over all
k and all bases β
Q =
1
|L|
∑
β∈L
Qβ , (52)
where Qβ is the average error rate found in each basis
Qβ =
∑
k,k′
k′ 6=k
tr
{
|ϕ∗(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)| ⊗ |ϕ(β,k′)〉〈ϕ(β,k′)|ρAB
}
,
(53)
and |L| is the number of bases in the set L.
The average Uhlmann fidelity of Bob’s states with re-
spect to Alice’s signal state is defined as
FB =
1
|L|
∑
β∈L
∑
k
tr
{
|ϕ∗(β,k)〉〈ϕ∗(β,k)| ⊗ |ϕ(β,k)〉〈ϕ(β,k)|ρAB
}
,
(54)
With the definition of Q above, FB and Q are related by
the simple relation FB = 1−Q.
VI. QUANTUM CLONERS
A quantum cloner is a map that creates two copies of
quantum states ϕx = |ϕx〉〈ϕx| drawn from a set S. Let
us define three isomorphic Hilbert spaces HA, HB and
HC each with dimension d. A cloner C is a completely
positive and trace preserving map C : HA → HB ⊗ HC
that takes a state ϕx ∈ HA to C(ϕx) ∈ HB ⊗ HC . The
quality of each copy k (k = B,C) is determined by the
single-clone Uhlmann fidelity fk(ϕx, C(ϕx)) of the copy
with respect to the original state ϕx. If the states ϕx are
pure, the Uhlmann fidelity reads
fB(ϕx, C(ϕx)) = tr{|ϕx〉〈ϕx|B ⊗ 1C · C(ϕx)} (55)
fC(ϕx, C(ϕx)) = tr{1B ⊗ |ϕx〉〈ϕx|C · C(ϕx)} (56)
Instead of fk(ϕx, C(ϕx)), it is often assumed that only
the average fidelity
Fk =
1
|S|
∑
ϕx∈S
fk(ϕx, C(ϕx)) (57)
is of interest. The cloner is called optimal if copy C
emerges with maximal average fidelity (FC), while the
fidelity FB of the copy B has a fixed value.
The cloning transformation can also be described us-
ing the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism with a non-
maximally entangled state. For this purpose, let C act
on the second half of a source state |Φ〉 defined in equa-
tion (1). This relates C to a positive operator σABC ∈
HA ⊗HB ⊗HC via the rule
σABC = (1⊗ C)|Φ〉〈Φ|. (58)
The trace-preserving property of C translates to σA =
trBC σABC = ρA, where ρA is the reduced state of the
source state |Φ〉 given in equation (4). From σABC the
map C can be recovered through the reverse transforma-
tion realized by
C(ϕx) = 1
p(x)
trA[Ax ⊗ 1B ⊗ 1C · σABC ]. (59)
where the Ax are the POVM elements defined in equation
(3). The reverse transformation effectively corresponds
to preparing the states |ϕx〉 in the source-replacement
scheme for the cloner.
A. Covariant cloners
We now give a description of quantum cloners based on
the work of Refs. [9, 18]. Let the set of quantum states
S is G-invariant. If the figure of merit is the average
fidelity, then for every cloning map σABC , the “rotated”
maps
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ UgσABC(U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug)† (60)
for g ∈ G yield the same average fidelity Fk as σABC .
Furthermore, due to the linearity of the trace, there exists
a covariant cloning map
σ¯ABC =
∑
g∈G
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ UgσABC(U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug)† (61)
with the same average fidelity Fk as σABC . As a conse-
quence, we can always choose the cloning map to be a
covariant map, without loss of generality. The covariant
state in equation (61) satisfies the commutation relation
[σ¯ABC , U
∗
g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug] = 0. (62)
9B. Strong covariant cloner
In this section we describe a subset of cloning maps
with a stronger symmetry than the covariant cloners,
called strong covariant cloners.
The unitary realization UC of the map C can be
uniquely described by the purification of σ¯ABC on the
extended Hilbert space H⊗6. This unitary realization
requires three ancillas. Some cloners, however, can be
realized using only one ancilla D, with UC now acting on
a smaller space HA⊗HB ⊗HC ⊗HD. In [9], these clon-
ers are called strong covariant cloners and are defined as
follows:
Definition 3 A cloner is called strong covariant if it has
a purification |Σ〉ABCD on HABCD with the property
U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗ Ug ⊗ U∗g |Σ〉ABCD = |Σ〉ABCD ∀g ∈ G. (63)
It is easy to see that the strong covariant cloners are a
subset of the covariant cloners: for every strong covari-
ant cloner |Σ〉, tracing over the fourth system returns a
covariant state σ¯ABC .
Since the set of covariant cloning maps σ¯ABC is a con-
vex set and the fidelity is a linear functional of the cloning
map, the cloning problem is a convex optimization prob-
lem [9]. The optimal cloner is an extremal point of the
convex set, that means, a map that cannot be written as
a convex sum of other maps in the set. We want to find
the extremal map with the maximal clone fidelity. In [9],
two theorems about extremal maps are given:
Theorem 3 (Chiribella et al. [9]). Let Ug be an ir-
reducible representation of the group G, and let K =
{σ¯ABC} denote the set of covariant cloning maps with
respect to G according to equation (62). Then, every
cloning map σ¯ABC , which allows a strong covariant pu-
rification is an extremal point of the convex set K.
This theorem states that the strong covariant maps are
a subset of the extremal maps. The converse - that the
extremal maps are a subset of the strong covariant maps
- is not true in general. The next theorem, however,
describes a special case in which the set of extremal maps
and the set of strong covariant maps coincide:
Theorem 4 (Chiribella et al. [9]). If the set of states
S to be cloned is G-invariant under the generalized Pauli
group Πd, then the set of strong covariant cloning maps
is equal to the set of extremal maps.
Theorem 4 allows to restrict the search of the optimal
cloner to strong covariant maps based on the symmetries
of the signal states alone. In section VII A we give the
definition of the generalized Pauli group.
VII. CONNECTION BETWEEN OPTIMAL
CLONERS AND OPTIMAL ATTACKS
We identify the optimal attack in QKD with an op-
timal cloner if Eve’s interaction UoptE coincides with the
optimal cloning transformation UoptC , or, in terms of the
purifications, if |Ψ〉opt = |Σ〉opt. The optimal attack is
always chosen from the set of purifications ∆ defined as
follows:
Definition 4 We define by ∆ the set that contains the
purifications |Ψ〉 of the symmetrized states in Γ¯. All
states in ∆ satisfy the symmetry condition U∗g ⊗ Ug ⊗
Ug ⊗U∗g |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉 for all g ∈ G, and they are compatible
with the averaged quantity Q and fixed ρA.
We observe that all eavesdropping attacks represented
by the set ∆ correspond to representations of strong co-
variant cloners. We can therefore make the following
conclusion:
Observation 1 The optimal cloner can only be the opti-
mal attack, if it is strong covariant. Otherwise, one can
already conclude that |Ψ〉opt 6= |Σ〉opt.
At this point, the strong covariance property alone
does not uniquely determine if the optimal attack is an
optimal cloner. Even if the optimal cloner is strong co-
variant, we can only conclude that the optimal attack is
an optimal cloner if the set ∆ contains exactly one state.
Otherwise, in order to compare the optimal attack with
the optimal cloner, we must perform the optimization.
A. Pauli-invariant signal states
As mentioned in theorem 4, a sufficient requirement
for a cloning map to allow a strong covariant realization
is the Pauli-invariance of the set of states to be cloned.
Hence, if the signal states of a QKD protocol are Pauli-
invariant, the corresponding cloning attack on that pro-
tocol is certainly realized by a strong covariant cloner.
Therefore, we will focus our attention on protocols with
signal states that are Pauli-invariant.
First, let us define the generalized Pauli group
Definition 5 The generalized Pauli group Πd in d di-
mensions has d2 elements. The set of unitaries
Ur,s =
d−1∑
k=0
ωks|k + r〉〈k|, ω = e2pii/d, (64)
for r, s = 0, ..., d − 1 form an irreducible unitary repre-
sentation of Πd on a d-dimensional Hilbert space. The
group has two generators
Z := U0,1, X := U1,0 (65)
which generate the entire group by the following relation:
Ur,s = X
rZs r, s = 0, ..., d− 1. (66)
A state ρAB that commutes with all U
∗
r,s⊗Ur,s is Bell-
diagonal
ρAB =
d−1∑
r,s=0
ur,s|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|, (67)
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with eigenvalues ur,s ≥ 0 that satisfy
∑
r,s ur,s = 1. The
eigenvectors
|Ur,s〉 = 1√
d
∑
k
ωks|k + r〉|k〉 (68)
are called Bell states and form a maximally entangled
basis of H⊗2. As shown in Refs. [4, 9], the gen-
eral form of the purification of ρAB is given by |Ψ〉 =∑
r,s
√
ur,s|Ur,s〉|Ur,d−s〉. Since Ur,s is an irreducible rep-
resentation, we can use Schur’s lemma in appendix E to
characterize the reduced state ρA =
1
d , which is propor-
tional to the identity.
VIII. EXAMPLES WITH MUTUALLY
UNBIASED BASES
Mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), which were first in-
troduced in Refs. [19, 20], are a common choice for the
signal states of QKD protocols. For example, in the
qubit space, the BB84 and the 6-state protocol use 2
and 3 MUBs, respectively. In higher-dimensional Hilbert
spaces, MUB protocols have been studied in Refs. [4–
6, 12, 21, 22].
MUBs are orthonormal bases Bα =
{|ψα1 〉, |ψα2 〉, ..., |ψαd−1〉} on d-dimensional Hilbert
spaces with the property |〈ψαk |ψα
′
k′ 〉| = 1√d for all
k, k′ = 0, ..., d− 1 and α 6= α′. In Ref. [23], it was shown
that when d is a prime number, there exist exactly
d + 1 MUBs. The eigenbases of the generalized Pauli
operators Z and XZβ for β = 0, ..., d − 1 form such
MUBs [24]. The eigenbasis of the operator Z is denoted
by the standard basis with the index Z,
BZ = {|ψZ1 〉, |ψZ2 〉, ..., |ψZd−1〉}, (69)
|ψZk 〉 = |k〉, (70)
and the eigenbases of the operators XZβ with indices
β = 0, ..., d− 1 by
Bβ = {|ψβ1 〉, |ψβ2 〉, ..., |ψβd−1〉}, (71)
|ψβk 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ω−kjω−βsj |j〉, (72)
where sj =
1
2 (d− j)(d+ j− 1), ω = e2pii/d, and where |j〉
are the basis vectors of the standard basis BZ .
Let us now consider protocols where the set of signal
states SL contains any subset of these d + 1 eigenbases.
In a slight generalization of the result of theorem 2.2 in
[24], we can show that the action fo any Pauli opera-
tor Ur,s on the eigenstates of the Pauli eigenbasis Bα for
α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d − 1} permutes the eigenstates without
changing the basis index α. Using this invariance, the set
of signal states SL of any such protocol are also Pauli-
invariant.
Unfortunately, the full symmetry groups of the sets SL
are not known explicitly. Thus, one cannot simply write
down the general form of the symmetrized states ρ¯AB ∈
Γ¯. However, in a first step, we can exploit the invariance
of the set SL with respect to the generalized Pauli group.
This partial symmetry implies that the optimal attack
ρoptAB must lie in the subset ΓBell containing only Bell-
diagonal states defined in equation (67).
Let us, therefore, calculate the key rate (16) for MUB
protocols with Bell-diagonal states ρAB . For this pur-
pose, we require the eigenvalue spectrum of each condi-
tional state on Bob’s side ρ
(α,k)
B for α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d−1},
given that Alice obtained the measurement outcome cor-
responding to the state |ψαk 〉. We project Alice’s system
of the Bell state onto |ψ∗αk 〉 and divide the result by a
normalization constant N :
ρ
(α,k)
B =
∑
r,s
ur,s〈ψ∗αk |Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|ψ∗αk 〉/N. (73)
In the following, all operations are modulo d, and in par-
ticular, the indices are to be understood modulo d. The
overlaps in (73) are found to be
〈ψ∗Zk |Ur,s〉 =
1√
d
ω(k−r)s|k − r〉 (74)
〈ψ∗βk |Ur,s〉 =
1√
d
ω−kr−
β
2 (r−r2)|ψβk−(s+βr)〉. (75)
for Z and for β ∈ {0, ..., d−1}. After reinserting the over-
laps into (73) and using by N = 1d , we do an index substi-
tution y = s+ βr in (75) to obtain the following expres-
sions for the conditional states for α ∈ {Z, 0, 1, ..., d− 1}
ρ
(α,k)
B =
∑
y
λαy |ψαk−y〉〈ψαk−y|. (76)
The set of eigenvalues Λα = {λα0 , λα1 , ..., λαd−1} for each
ρ
(α,k)
B is independent of the index k with the specific val-
ues
λZy =
d−1∑
r=0
uy,r for Z (77)
λβy =
d−1∑
r=0
ur,y−βr for β ∈ {0, ..., d− 1}. (78)
The average error rate, the mutual information and the
Holevo quantity (52, 46, 47) can now be calculated using
the eigenvalue spectrum
Q = 1− 1|L|
∑
α∈L
λα0 , (79)
I¯(E(ρAB)) = log2 d−
1
|L|
∑
α∈L
H(Λα), (80)
χ¯(E(ρAB)) = S(ρAB)− 1|L|
∑
α∈L
H(Λα), (81)
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with the Shannon entropy H(Λα) = −∑y λαy log(λαy )
and the von Neumann entropy S(ρ) = − tr ρ log ρ. The
key rate (16) follows straightforwardly,
r¯(E(ρAB)) = log d− S(ρAB). (82)
For the special protocols with 2, d and d + 1 MUBs,
we further confine our search for the optimal attack to
smaller subsets Γ˜ ⊂ ΓBell. The procedure is essentially
the same as the one we used in section V to reduce to the
subset Γ¯ from the set Γave. For each state ρAB in ΓBell,
we generate an equivalence class of states {ρ(Pi)AB ; i =
1, ..., n} by applying permutations Pi to the eigenvalues of
ρAB . In contrast to the states ρ
(Ug)
AB in equation (34), the
states ρ
(Pi)
AB are not generated using the symmetry group
of the signal states. However, since the key rate (82) is
proportional to S(ρAB), all permuted states satisfy the
invariance property r¯(E(ρAB)) = r¯(E(ρ(Pi)AB )). Further-
more, we chose the permutations in such a way, that the
ρ
(Pi)
AB give the same error rate as ρAB . This ensures that
the ρ
(Pi)
AB are again in ΓBell. Consequently, since the con-
vexity property (38) of the key rate holds for protocols
with MUBs, we can conclude that the optimal attack is
found in the subset Γ˜ ⊂ ΓBell containing only convex
combinations,
ρ˜AB =
1
n
∑
i
ρ
(Pi)
AB ∈ Γ˜.
Note that it suffices to check that the states ρ
(Pi)
AB have
the same average error rate Q as ρAB in order to be in
the set ΓBell. We do not need to monitor the condition
on ρA, because ρA = 1/d is automatically satisfied for
any Bell-diagonal state.
A. 2 MUBs
We describe here how to obtain the states ρ˜AB ∈ Γ˜
for the example of the 2 MUBs protocol with the signal
states SL = {B0,BZ}: given a Bell-diagnoal states ρAB .
As mentioned above, we generate the (Bell-diagonal) per-
muted states ρ
(Pi)
AB by keeping the error rate (79) of ρAB
invariant
Q = 1− 1
2
(
λ00 + λ
Z
0
)
= 1− 1
2
(
2u0,0 +
d−1∑
r=1
(ur,0 + u0,r)
)
.
(83)
The invariance of Q is guaranteed if the permutations
Pi leave the sets Ua = {u0,0}, Ub = {u0,r, ur,0; r =
1, ..., d− 1} and Uc = {ur,s; r, s = 1, ..., d− 1} invariant.
Such permutations Pi are, for example, independent per-
mutations of the eigenvalues in each set. Therefore, in
the convex combination ρ˜AB , the average over all eigen-
values in each set will appear. In this particular case,
ρ˜AB has three different types of independent eigenvalues
a, b and c corresponding to the three sets Ua, Ub and
Uc,
ρ˜AB = a|U0,0〉〈U0,0|+ c
d−1∑
r,s=1
|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|+ (84)
b
d−1∑
r=1
(|Ur,0〉〈Ur,0|+ |U0,r〉|U0,r〉) .
Now we can use the average error rate condition Q =
(d − 1)b + (d − 1)2c and the normalization condition
a + 2(d − 1)b + d2c = 1, to further reduce the num-
ber of independent eigenvalues to only one. Through
an (analytical) optimization of the key rate over the free
eigenvalue, we find the following values for a, b and c that
describe the optimal attack
a = (1−Q)2, b = Q(1−Q)
d− 1 , c =
Q2
(d− 1) . (85)
These are exactly the same that also describe the optimal
phase-covariant cloner in d dimensions [4]. The connec-
tion between optimal cloning and the optimal attack for
2 MUBs was already conjectured in [4]. The key rates
for these protocols, which were independently obtained
in Ref. [13], are given by
rmin = log d+ 2(1−Q) log(1−Q) + 2Q log
(
Q
d− 1
)
.
They are plotted for d = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13 in Fig. 3. Note
that this plot is not intended to compare the perfor-
mances of the different protocols. For a fair comparison,
one must specify the channel model for which the key
rates are drawn.
B. d+ 1 MUBs
Consider protocols with the signal states SL =
{BZ ,B0,B1, ...Bd−1}. In contrast to the case with 2
MUBs, these protocols are tomographically complete.
With the same strategy as for 2 MUBs, we construct
the set Γ˜ for this situation: The error rate (79) of a Bell-
diagonal state in this scenario is given by
Q = 1− 1
d+ 1
(d+ 1)u0,0 + ∑
(r,s)6=(0,0)
ur,s
 (86)
where we used the relation that for r 6= 0, the sum∑d−1
β=0 ur,−βr =
∑d−1
γ=0 ur,γ . The error rate defines the sets
Ua = {u0,0} with one eigenvalue, and Ub = {ur,s; (r, s) 6=
(0, 0)} with the remaining d2− 1 eigenvalues. Again, Ua
and Ub determine the form of the states in the set Γ˜,
after averaging over all permutations Pi
ρ˜AB = a|U0,0〉〈U0,0|+ b
∑
(r,s)6=(0,0)
|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|. (87)
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FIG. 3: Key rates of protocols with (a) d + 1, (b) 2 and (c) d MUBs for d = 2 (black), d = 3 (blue), d = 5 (purple) , d = 7
(yellow) , d = 11 (green) and d = 13 (red). These plots do not serve as a comparison of the performance of the different
protocols.
In this situation, the average eigenvalues a and b are
uniquely defined by the error rate Q = d(d − 1)b and
the trace condition a+ (d2 − 1)b = 1
a = 1− d+ 1
d
Q, b =
Q
d(d− 1) . (88)
As there is only one state in Γ˜ for this protocol, the
optimization of the key rate becomes trivial, and we can
conclude that the optimal cloner and the optimal attack
are equal. This connection was already conjectured in [4].
The cloner in this case is the optimal universal cloner in
d dimensions [25, 26]. For d = 2, we recover the the 6-
state protocol, where the optimal cloner is the universal
cloner [3, 27], which clones all the states on the Bloch
sphere equally well. The key rates of these protocols are
given by
rmin = log d+
d+ 1
d
Q log
(
Q
d(d− 1)
)
(89)
+
(
1− d+ 1
d
Q
)
log
(
1− d+ 1
d
Q
)
,
as independently shown in Ref. [13]. We plot the key
rates for d = 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13 in Fig. 3. Again, the plot is
not intended to compare the performance of the proto-
cols.
C. d MUBs
The signal states of protocols using d MUBs are SL =
{B0,B1, ...Bd−1}. Unlike the protocols with d MUBs, the
protocols analyzed here are not tomographically com-
plete. The error rate
Q = 1− 1
d
(
d u0,0 +
d−1∑
r=0
d−1∑
s=1
ur,s
)
(90)
defines three sets Ua = {u0,0}, Ub = {ur,s; r = 0, ..., d−
1, s = 1, ..., d−1} and Uc = {u0,s; s = 1, ..., d−1}, which
determine the form of ρ˜AB ∈ Γ˜
ρ˜AB = a|U0,0〉〈U0,0|+ c
d−1∑
s=1
|U0,s〉〈U0,s|+ (91)
b
d−1∑
r=0
d−1∑
s=1
|Ur,s〉〈Ur,s|.
The eigenvalues a, b and c are further constriced by the
normalization condition a+ d(d− 1)b+ (d− 1)c = 1, and
the error rate condition for ρ˜AB Q = (d−1)2b+ (d−1)c.
We can express two of the three eigenvalues by
a = 1 + c− dQ
d− 1 b =
Q− (d− 1)c
(d− 1)2 . (92)
We perform an optimization of the key rate over the free
eigenvalue c, and plot the numerically obtained key rates
rmin in Fig. 3 for different dimensions.
We compare the optimal attack to the optimal multi-
ple phase-covariant (MPC) cloner UMPC given in Ref.
[28]. This cloner copies all states of the form |ψ〉 =
1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 e
iφj |j〉 for φj ∈ [0, 2pi) optimally. If it is known
that the eavesdropper performed an attack based on the
optimal MPC cloner, Alice and Bob can expect some key
rate rMPC. Numerical optimizations for d = 3, 5, 7, 11
and 13 show that rMPC is always bigger (or equal) than
the key rate rmin. Therefore, the optimal MPC cloner
is not the optimal attack: UMPC 6= UoptE . In Fig. 4 we
plot the difference between the key rates rMPC − rmin,
and the difference between the fidelities FMPCE − F attackE
for d = 3, where F attackE is Eve’s fidelity when using the
optimal attack.
We would like to remark that the UMPC produces op-
timal copies of more than just the necessary d MUBs.
It is possible that there exists a cloner Ud that provides
copies of the d MUBs with a higher fidelity F dE (for fixed
error rate) than UMPC: F
d
E ≥ FMPCE . This raises the
question, if the cloner Ud could be the optimal attack
UoptE . To answer this, we turn the question around and
ask from the cloning point of view, whether the opti-
mal attack UoptE can play the role of the optimal cloner
13
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FIG. 4: (a) A plot of the difference of the key rates δr =
rMPC − rmin for the scenarios where Eve uses the optimal
cloner (rMPC), and where she uses the optimal attack (rmin)
for d = 3. (b) A plot of the difference of the fidelities δFE =
FMPCE − F attackE for the scenarios where Eve uses the optimal
MPC cloner (FMPCE ) and where she uses the optimal attack
(F attackE ) for d = 3.
Ud. For this purpose, we compare Eve’s fidelity F
attack
E ,
when she used the optimal attack to the fidelity F dE , when
she used Ud. We know from our numerical optimization
how F attackE compares to F
MPC
E : we plotted the differ-
ence FMPCE − F attackE in Fig. 4. From this plot we see
that, in general, FMPCE > F
attack
E . However, we know
by construction of Ud that the fidelity F
d
E ≥ FMPCE . By
transitivity it follows that F dE > F
attack
E , which proves
that the optimal attack is not equivalent to the optimal
cloner Ud either.
In table I we summarize the results obtained for the
MUB protocols. It turns out that in general the intuition
that the optimal attack is always an optimal cloner proves
wrong, as can be seen for the protocols with d MUBs.
IX. CLASSES OF PROTOCOLS WITH THE
SAME OPTIMAL ATTACK
We observe that for certain protocols with different sig-
nal states, the same attack ρoptAB is found to be optimal.
Given two protocols P and P ′ with sets of signal states
S and S′ that are G- and G′-invariant, respectively. We
consider only protocols where the signal states are or-
thogonal bases, and where Alice and Bob postselect on
events in the same basis. These protocols were already
described in section V D. We denote the average error
rate for each protocol by Q and Q′. Let us denote Alice
and Bob’s POVM elements by Ax and By for the protocol
P and by A′x′ and B
′
y′ for the protocol P
′ which are given
in equation (42) and (43). The POVMs conditioned on
the basis announcement u given in equations (44) and
(45) are denoted by MuA and M
u
B for protocol P and by
M′u
′
A and M
′u′
B for protocol P
′. The sets characterizing
the possible symmetric attacks are denoted by Γ¯ and Γ¯′.
We also define the set of twirled states as follows
Definition 6 The sets of all twirled bipartite states ρ¯AB
with respect to the group G is
TG = {T G[ρAB ]|ρAB ∈ HA ⊗HB}.
The following theorem states the criteria under which
two protocols have the same optimal attack.
Theorem 5 If the following three conditions are satis-
fied, the protocols P and P ′ have the same optimal attack
(I) TG = TG′ .
(II) The average measurement quantities Q and Q′ pro-
vide the same constraints on all ρ¯AB in TG and
TG′ .
(III) There exists a third group H with a representation
{Wh;h ∈ H}, such that G and G′ are subgroups of
H, with the following properties:
(a) TH = TG = TG′ , and
(b) for all POVM elements Ax ∈MA and A′x′ ∈
M′A there exists a Wh(x,x′) in H such that
|L|2W ∗h(x,x′)AxWTh(x,x′) = |L′|2A′x′ . (93)
Note that IIIb automatically implies the relation
|L|2Wh(x,x′)BxW †h(x,x′) = |L′|2B′x′ for Bob’s mea-
surement operators By defined in equation (43).
Proof. We show that the optimization of the key rate
in equation (40) leads to the same optimal ρoptAB for both
protocols. There are two parts to the proof. First, from
(I) and (II) it follows that Γ¯ = Γ¯′ by definition. There-
fore, the set over which the key rate is optimized is iden-
tical for the two protocols. Second, we show that the
mutual information I¯(E(ρ¯AB)) and the Holevo quantity
χ¯(E(ρ¯AB)) in equations (46, 47) are identical for both
protocols for all states in the set Γ¯. We show this for the
example of the mutual information, but the same argu-
ments apply to the Holevo quantity as well.
As a starting point, we switch to the language where
the unitaries act on the sets MuA and M
u
B instead of the
individual elements Ax and By. The action of each uni-
tary U on the Ax and By defines uniquely the action
of the same unitary U on MuA and M
u
B by the relation
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TABLE I: Summary of optimal attack of protocols using MUBs in d dimensions. For the protocols where the optimal attack
is an optimal cloner we put a checkmark (X). Where the optimal attack is not an optimal cloner we put a cross (×). The
numerical optimizations cover the cases of d MUBs up to d = 13.
Number of MUBs
Dimension 2 MUBs 3 MUBs 4 MUBs 5 MUBs 6 MUBs . . . d MUBs d+1 MUBs
2 X X
3 X × X
5 X × X
...
...
. . .
d X X
in (25 26). This correspondence allows us to uniquely
relabel Wh(x,x′) by Wh(u,u′), where u and u
′ are the ba-
sis announcements found in P and P ′, respectively. We
can now restate (IIIa) and say that there exists unitaries
Wh(u,u′) for all pairs (u, u
′) such that
W ∗h(u,u′)M
u
AW
T
h(u,u′) = M
′u′
A (94)
Wh(u,u′)M
u
BW
†
h(u,u′) = M
′u′
B . (95)
Furthermore, for a fixed u0 in P , there exist unitaries
Wh(u0,u) = Wh(u,u′)Wh(u′,u0), connecting all u in P to
the fixed u0. Similarly, there exist unitaries Wh(u′0,u′)
connecting a fixed u′0 to all u
′ in P ′. Using the invari-
ance ρ¯AB = W
∗
h ⊗Whρ¯AB(W ∗h ⊗Wh)† for all Wh ∈ H
and lemma 1, the total mutual information of P and P ′
satisfies the following
I¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = 1|L|
|L|∑
u=1
I(ρ¯AB ,M
u
AB) = I(ρ¯AB ,M
u0
AB),
I¯(E ′(ρ¯AB)) = 1|L′|
|L′|∑
u′=1
I(ρ¯AB ,M
′u′
AB) = I(ρ¯AB ,M
′u′0
AB).
A similar statement can be made for the Holevo quantity
as well.
Since there exists also a unitary Wh(u0,u′0), we can con-
clude that
I(ρ¯AB ,M
u0
AB) = I(ρ¯AB ,M
′u′0
AB) (96)
from which we conclude that I¯(E(ρ¯AB)) = I¯(E ′(ρ¯AB))
Again, a similar statement holds for the Holevo quantity.
It follows now that the same function r¯(E(ρAB)) =
r¯(E ′(ρAB)) appears in the optimization of protocols P
and P ′. Since these are now identical optimization prob-
lems, they must have the same solution, and therefore
the same optimal attack. 
We will give some examples of protocols with the same
optimal attack in the next section. We analyze qubit
protocols, where we can make use of the point group
symmetries, which are commonly used and well studied
in the field of crystallography.
A. Protocols with the same optimal attack as the
6-state protocol
The signal states of the 6-state protocol form a regu-
lar octahedron in the Bloch sphere representation. The
symmetry group G that maps an octahedron onto itself
is the discrete group O with a unitary irreducible repre-
sentation on the qubit space. A symmetry group G′ that
satisfy the criterium (I) in theorem 5 is for example the
icosahedron group I [29, 30].
We can now construct protocols with signal states that
are invariant under O- or I-symmetry. For example,
let us examine protocols, where the signal states form
a cube (O-symmetry), a dodecahedron (I-symmetry) or
an icosahedron (again I-symmetry) on the Bloch sphere,
consisting of 8, 20 and 12 states, respectively. For each
state there exists an orthogonal state on the opposite side
of the Bloch sphere. See Fig. 5 for a representation of
the signal states of the 6-state and the cube protocol.
The average error rate adopts the same form for all
these protocols, namely, Q = 2b, where b is defined in
equation (87). Therefore, condition (II) in theorem 5 is
also satisfied, and we conclude that the sets Γ¯ for these
protocols are identical to the set given in the case of the
6-state protocol. Since there is only one state in Γ¯ for
the 6-state protocol, we can already conclude that the
optimal attack of the 6-state, the cube, the icosahedron
and the dodecahedron protocols are the same, which was
already established to be the optimal universal cloner.
B. Protocols with the same optimal attack as the
BB84 protocol
We analyze protocols with 2n (n ≥ 2) signal states
|ϕx〉, that are distributed equally in the equatorial plane
of the Bloch sphere, represented by the Bloch vectors
s(2n)x = (sin(pix/n), 0, cos(pix/n)) x = 0, ..., 2n− 1.
(97)
For each state |ϕx〉 there exists an orthogonal state |ϕ¯x〉
on the opposite side of the Bloch sphere, which together
form a basis. For n = 2, we recover the signal states of
the BB84 protocol. In Fig. 6 the signal states of the
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FIG. 5: Representation of sets of signal states on the Bloch
sphere related to the 6-state protocol. (a) States that are
invariant under SU(2) (b) States of the 6-state protocol (Oc-
tahedron), invariant under O-symmetry, (c) States of the cube
protocol, invariant under O-symmetry.
2n protocols for n = 2, 3 are represented on the Bloch
sphere.
The symmetry group of the signal states of the 2n-
protocol is called the dihedral group denoted by D2n. In
the multiplication tables of Refs. [29, 30], we find the
form of the set TD2n for n = 2, 3. It turns out that
TD6 = TD4 , where TD4 contains the symmetrized states
of the BB84 protocol given in equation (84) for d = 2.
The error rate Q = b + c of the 2n-protocol with n = 3
is the same as for the BB84 protocol, where b and c are
defined in equation (84). Thus we can conclude that
Γ¯6 = Γ¯4 ≡ Γ¯BB84.
Let us define Alice’s POVM elements of the BB84 and
the 2n-protocol by A
(BB84)
x for x = 1, ...4 and A
(2n)
x′ for
x′ = 1, ..., 2n. In both cases, the POVM elements are
projectors onto the signal states. We can identify the
group H in theorem 5 by the phase-covariant symmetry
group D∞ = U(1) × Π2, where Π2 is the Pauli group of
dimension 2 and U(1) is the unitary group. In the tables
of Ref. [30], we find that the set TD∞ is identical to
TD4 and TD6 . The phase-covariant group contains all
rotations about the axis (0, 1, 0) on the Bloch sphere, as
well as rotations by pi about all axes lying in the (x, z)-
plane. Thus, it also contains group elements that satisfy
(IIIb) of theorem 5 for any pair A
(BB84)
x and A
(2n)
x′ . Since
all criteria of (III) are satisfied by D∞, the optimal attack
for the 2n-protocol for n = 3 can be identified by the
optimal phase-covariant cloner, which is also the optimal
attack of the BB84 protocol.
C. The cuboid protocol
For some protocols with tomographically complete
measurement settings the set Γ¯ contains more than one
state. This has to do with loss of information during
the symmetrization process. Recall that Alice and Bob
only keep the averaged quantity Q, but otherwise ignore
the measurement outcomes completely. This means that
introducing symmetries to a problem can come at the
expense of increasing the number of states in Γ¯.
As an example consider a qubit protocol where the
signal states lie on the corners of a rectangular cuboid.
!0,y,0"!axis !0,y,0"!axis!0,y,0"!axis
(b)(a) (c)
Tuesday, September 20, 2011
FIG. 6: Representation of signal states on the Bloch sphere
for protocols related to the BB84 protocol. (a) States that
are invariant under D∞ (b) States of the BB84 protocol,
D4-symmetry (c) States of the 2n protocol for n = 3, D6-
symmetry
The signal states are specified by the Bloch vectors
sx = (± sin θ,± cos θ, 0) (98)
sz = (0,± cos θ,± sin θ), (99)
where θ describes the angle between the (0, y, 0)-axis of
the Bloch sphere and the corners of the cuboid. This
protocol is composed of 4 bases. For each state |ϕx〉
there exists an orthogonal state |ϕ¯x〉 on the opposite side
of the Bloch sphere.
The symmetry group of this protocol is the same as of
the BB84 protocol (D4). Although (I) in theorem 5 is
satisfied, the error rate of the cuboid protocol is given by
Q = 12 (3b + c + (b − c) cos(2θ)), which is different from
the BB84 error definition. Moreover, we could not find a
group H to satisfy the condition (III). We performed nu-
merical optimizations and found that the optimal attack
of the cuboid protocol is not equal to the optimal attack
on the BB84 protocol. It is also not the optimal cloner.
Note that for θ = pi2 , we recover the BB84 protocol. For
θ = pi4 the signal states span a cube, which we already
discussed in section IX A.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyze the connection between the
optimal attack on a QKD protocol and the optimal
cloning attack, in which the eavesdropper uses an optimal
cloner to attack the protocol. We analyze protocols that
have sufficient symmetries in the signal states and the
post processing of the classical data, so that the optimal
attack is, without loss of generality, a symmetric attack
in the framework of the security proof of Refs. [1, 2].
We compare the optimal symmetric attack to optimal
covariant cloners. It turns out that a necessary condition
for the cloning transformation to be an optimal attack is
the strong covariance condition, which guarantees that
the optimal attack and the optimal cloner are chosen
from the same set. However, this condition is not suf-
ficient to uniquely identify the optimal attack with the
optimal cloner, except in the case where only one state
is found in the set from which the optimal attack and
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the optimal cloner are chosen. Protocols which use d+ 1
MUBs fall into this category.
We analyze the optimal attack of protocols using 2, d
and d + 1 MUBs in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Intu-
itively, one expects that the optimal attack can always
be identified with an optimal cloner. We prove that this
intuition is correct in the case of 2 and d + 1 MUBs,
but for protocols using d MUBs, the connection between
optimal attack and optimal cloner fails.
We show that two protocols using different signal states
can be shown to give rise to the same optimal eavesdrop-
ping attack. Whether this is the case can be investigated
by simple analysis of the symmetries of the signal states,
and we give examples related to the 6-state and the BB84
protocol.
During the preparation of this manuscript a related
preprint [13] has appeared, where the key rates of pro-
tocols using 2 and d + 1 MUBs in d dimensions were
calculated. In contrast to Ref. [13], our emphasis lies
on establishing the general connection between optimal
cloning and optimal eavesdropping.
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Appendix A: Post selection
In many cases Alice and Bob share data at the end of
the quantum phase of their protocol, that contains unus-
able parts for the key generation. Typically they postse-
lect on a set of useful data. The postselection which we
describe here applies for example to basis sifting, or to
the case where Alice and Bob discard data points because
Bob did not receive a signal.
Let us first examine the classical version of the posts-
election protocol, which starts with the ccq state ρXYE .
In the postselection described here, an announcement
is made for each individual signal. After the quantum
phase, Alice and Bob identify the weakly correlated data
that they want to filter out by calculating to each mea-
surement outcome x and y some values f(x) = v and
f(y) = w, and announcing v and w publicly. Typically,
the announcements v and w do not reveal any informa-
tion about the key. Based on the announcements, Alice
and Bob decide of they want to keep the data or dis-
card it. For example, they can keep only those events
where v = w ≡ u. In particular, v and w often plays the
role of a basis announcement where Alice and Bob only
keep those events which they measured in the same ba-
sis, namely where v = w ≡ u, and discard the rest of the
signals, where v 6= w. By identifying the values v and w,
Alice and Bob effectively partition their original POVMs
MA and MB into subsets m
v
A = {Ax : f(x) = v} and
mwB = {By : f(y) = w}, each containing the POVM ele-
ments labeled by the value v or w of the announcement.
The quantum version of the postselection procedure
is described by the map E , which is composed of two
consecutive steps: First, the announcement and filtering,
which is jointly described by a quantum operation, and
second, the measurement of the remaining states.
The announcement and filtering is described by a
quantum operation with Kraus operators Ku ⊗ Lu on
HA⊗HB . Since only events with w = v ≡ u are kept, the
Kraus operators come in paris Ku⊗Lu with the same in-
dex u. The Kraus operators satisfy
∑
uK
†
uKu⊗L†uLu ≤
1, and they are related to the POVM elements in muA and
muB by the rule Ku =
√∑
muA
Ax and Lu =
√∑
muB
By.
The probability that the state ρAB is kept during the
postselection is pkept. There is also a Kraus operator
corresponding to the discarded events, which happens
with probability 1− pkept. For each Kraus operator, the
information u is announced to all parties and stored in
three classical registers A¯, B¯ and E¯ held by Alice, Bob
and Eve, respectively. The state after the quantum op-
eration held by Alice, Bob and Eve, conditioned on kept
events is given by
ψ =
∑
u
p(u)|Ψu〉〈Ψu| ⊗ |u〉〈u|A¯B¯E¯ , (A1)
where |Ψu〉 = Ku ⊗Lu ⊗ 1E |Ψ〉/
√
p˜(u) is the pure state
conditioned on the announcement u with normalization
p˜(u), and p(u) = p˜(u)/pkept is the normalized probability
distribution of the announcement u conditioned on events
that were kept.
The announcement and filtering step is followed by a
measurement to extract the remaining data. Each |Ψu〉 is
measured with respect to new (normalized) POVMs MuA
and MuB with elements conditioned on the announcement
u:
MuA = {Aux} = {K−1u AxK−1†u : Ax ∈muA} (A2)
MuB = {Buy } = {L−1u ByL−1
†
u : By ∈muB} (A3)
The inverses K−1u and L
−1
u are defined on the non-zero
subspace of Ku and Lu only. Again, the new POVMs
only come in paris with the same index u.
The measurement of |Ψu〉 with respect to the new
POVM Mu = MuA ⊗MuB is equivalent to the measure-
ment of |Ψ〉 with respect to the original POVM, namely
trAB{Aux ⊗ Buy ⊗ 1E |Ψu〉〈Ψu|} = 1p˜(u) trAB{Ax ⊗ By ⊗
1E |Ψ〉〈Ψ|}. The measurement transforms |Ψu〉 into a
ccq state
|Ψu〉〈Ψu| → ρuXY E =
∑
Mu
pu(x, y)|x, y〉〈x, y| ⊗ ρxyE (A4)
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with pu(x, y) = tr{Aux⊗Buy⊗1E |Ψu〉〈Ψu|} = p(x, y)/p˜(u)
and the conditional states ρxyE = trAB{Ax ⊗ By ⊗
1|Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x, y).
We choose to calculate the key rate from each ccq state
ρuXY E independently, which leads to the effective key rate
r¯(E(ρAB)) =
∑
u
p(u)r(ρuXY E). (A5)
Appendix B: Proof of the weak convexity of the
classical mutual information
In this appendix we prove theorem 1 in section IV.
Proof. The mutual information I(ρAB ,MAB) de-
pends only on the probability distribution p(x, y).
For ρ¯AB the mutual information is explicitly given
by I(ρ¯AB ,MAB) = H(p¯(x)) − H(X|Y )p¯, where
H(p(x)) = −∑x p(x) log p(x) is the Shannon entropy,
and H(X|Y )p¯ =
∑
x,y p¯(x, y) log
(
p¯(x,y)
p¯(y)
)
is the condi-
tional entropy. The first term satisfies
H(p¯(x)) = H(p(x)) = H(q(x)), (B1)
because p(x) = q(x) = p¯(x). The second term, the con-
ditional entropy, is concave, namely
H(X|Y )p¯ ≤ λH(X|Y )p + (1− λ)H(X|Y )q, (B2)
where H(X|Y )p = −
∑
x,y p(x, y) log
(
p(x,y)
p(y)
)
and sim-
ilarly for H(X|Y )q. The concavity of the conditional
entropy is shown by applying the log sum inequality [31],(∑
i
ai
)
log
(∑
j aj∑
k bk
)
≤
∑
i
ai log
(
ai
bi
)
, (B3)
to H(X|Y )p¯. Equations (B1) and (B2) together imply
the weak convexity of the classical mutual information.

Appendix C: Proof of the concavity of the Holevo
quantity
In this appendix we prove theorem 2 in section IV. We
will use the traditional notation
χ(X : E)ρXE :=
∑
x
p(x)S(ρxE)
to denote the Holevo quantity of the cq state ρXE =∑
x p(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE .
Proof. Given the states ρAB and σAB with purifica-
tions |Ψ〉ABE′ and |Σ〉ABE′ on the system E = E′. Alice
measures the states with respect to the POVM elements
Ax and stores the result in the system X. The cq states
describing the situation for Alice and Eve after the mea-
surement are
|Ψ〉 → ρXE′ =
∑
x
p(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE′ , (C1)
|Σ〉 → σXE′ =
∑
x
q(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ σxE′ , (C2)
with Eve’s conditional states ρxE′ = trAB{Ax ⊗
1|Ψ〉〈Ψ|}/p(x) and σxE′ = trAB{Ax⊗1|Σ〉〈Σ|}/q(x). The
Holevo quantity of ρXE′ and σXE′ is given by
χ(ρAB ,MA)) = χ(X : E
′)ρXE′ ,
χ(σAB ,MA)) = χ(X : E
′)σXE′ . (C3)
We construct a particular purification on the joint sys-
tem E = E′F for the convex sum ρ¯AB = λρAB + (1 −
λ)σAB :
|Ψ¯〉ABE′F =
√
λ|Ψ〉|0〉F +
√
1− λ|Σ〉|1〉F . (C4)
After measuring |Ψ¯〉ABE′F with respect to Ax, the state
shared by Alice and Eve is
ρ¯XE′F =
∑
x
p¯(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ¯xE′F (C5)
with Eve’s conditional states ρ¯xE′F = trAB{Ax ⊗
1BE′F |Ψ¯〉〈Ψ¯|}/p¯(x) and p¯(x) = λp(x) + (1−λ)q(x). The
Holevo quantity of ρ¯XE′F is
χ(ρ¯AB ,MA)) = χ(X : E
′F )ρXE′F .
Let M : F → F ′ be a trace-preserving quantum oper-
ation. For our purposes, we identify M with a measure-
ment on F in the standard basis {|0〉, |1〉} and write the
outcome in a new register F ′. By defining λx = λ
p(x)
p¯(x) ,
the state after the measurement is given by
ρXE′F ′ =
∑
x
p¯(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ [λxρxE′ ⊗ |0〉〈0|F ′ (C6)
+(1− λx)σxE′ ⊗ |1〉〈1|F ′ ]. (C7)
Let us state a lemma about the Holevo quantity ex-
tracted from a state of the form ρXE′F ′ :
Lemma 3 The Holevo quantity extracted from ρXE′F ′
satisfies
χ(X : E′F ′)ρXE′F ′ ≥ λχ(X : E′)ρXE′ + (C8)
(1− λ)χ(X : E′)σXE′ ,
with χ(X : E′)ρXE′ and χ(X : E
′)σXE′ given in equation
(C3). Equality holds, if the probabilities λx are indepen-
dent of x, λx = λ.
Proof. From ρXE′F ′ we calculate the Holevo quantity us-
ing the joint entropy theorem of the von Neuman entropy
[32]
χ(X : EF ′) = λχ(X : E′)ρXE′ + (1− λ)χ(X : E′)σXE′
+h(λ)−
∑
x
p¯(x)h(λx), (C9)
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with the binary entropy function h(x) = −x log(x)−(1−
x) log(1−x), and where χ(X : E′)ρXE′ and χ(X : E′)σXE′
are given in equation (C3). From the concavity of the
Shannon entropy it follows that h(λ)−∑x p¯(x)h(λx) ≥ 0,
and in particular, if λ = λx for all x, the equality holds.

According to [32], a map of the form M : F → F ′ can
only decrease the Holevo quantity:
χ(X : E′F )ρXE′F ≥ χ(X : E′F ′)ρXE′F ′ . (C10)
Equation (C8) together with equation (C10), show that
the desired result. 
Appendix D: Proof of lemma 2
In this appendix we prove the G∗-invariance of ρA and
Ax for the source-replacement scheme in section II, if
p(x) is uniformly distributed and if the signal states are
G-invariant.
Proof. We trace out system S from the source state
|Φ〉AS in equation (2) and identify Alice’s reduced state
ρA by
ρA =
∑
i
κi|i〉〈i| =
∑
x
p(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|. (D1)
From the G-invariance of the signal states and the uni-
form distribution of p(x), it follows that ρA is also G-
invariant. Since ρA is diagonal in the basis B with real
eigenvalues κi, it holds that
ρ∗A = ρA.
Therefore, ρA is also G
∗-invariance (where the complex
conjugate is taken with respect to the Schmidt basis) as
can be easily seen from U∗g ρAU
T
g = (UgρAU
†
g )
∗ = ρA.
Due to the positivity of the coefficients κi and the full
rank of ρA, the square root
√
ρA and the inverse ρ
−1
A are
well-defined. The G- and G∗-invariance of ρ−1A can be
straightforwardly verified: Ugρ
−1
A U
†
g = (UgρAU
†
g )
−1 =
ρ−1A , and similarly for the G
∗-invariance.
In [17], it is shown for permutation groups, that for
every positive G-invariant operator ρA,
√
ρA is also G-
invariant. The same proof applies also here, and thus,
the G- and G∗-invariance of ρA also implies the G- and
G∗-invariance of
√
ρA.
By using the G-invariance of the signals states, and the
G∗-invariance of
√
ρA and ρ
−1
A , the G
∗-invariance of Ax
follows directly from the definition in equation (3).
Appendix E: Properties of symmetrized states
The symmetrized states with the commutation prop-
erty (36) can be characterized using Schur’s lemma. Let
the unitaries U
(µ)
g denote the irreducible representation
µ of a group G on the Hilbert spaces Hµ. Every reducible
representation of G can be decomposed into a direct sum
of irreducible representations. For example, the tensor
product U
(ν)∗
g ⊗ U (ν)g is a reducible representation of G
and can be decomposed into a (block diagonal) direct
sum of irreducible representations U
(µ)
g,i defined on the
spaces H(µ)i carrying the irreducible representations µ
U (ν)∗g ⊗ U (ν)g =
⊕
µ
mµ⊕
i=1
U
(µ)
g,i . (E1)
Each irreducible representation µ occurs with integer
multiplicity mµ indicated by the index i.
According to Schur’s lemma, an operator τ
(µ,ν)
i,j :
H(µ)i → H(ν)j that satisfies τ (µ,ν)i,j U (µ)g,i = U (ν)g,j τ (µ,ν)i,j for
all g ∈ G is either (i) the identity map from H(µ)i → H(µ)j
if µ = ν, or (ii) equal to zero. Using Schur’s lemma, every
positive operator ρ¯AB that commutes with all the group
elements of U
(ν)∗
g ⊗ U (ν)g is characterized by
ρ¯AB =
⊕
µ
mµ⊕
i,j=1
c
(µ)
ij τ
(µ)
ij (E2)
where the c(µ) are mµ×mµ matrices with positive eigen-
values λ
(µ)
i and τ
(µ)
ij is the identity map between the
subspaces with equal representation. After diagonaliz-
ing c(µ), we can rewrite ρ¯AB in a block-diagonal form on
a new decomposition K(µ)i of the Hilbert space by
ρ¯AB =
⊕
µ
mµ⊕
i=1
λ
(µ)
i 1
(µ)
i (E3)
where 1
(µ)
i is the identity on the subspace K(µ)i . The
block-diagonal form of U
(ν)∗
g ⊗ U (ν)g is quasi “inherited”
by ρ¯AB .
Appendix F: Post selection on orthonormal bases
In this appendix we calculate the filters Ku and Lu for
the class of protocols described in section V D.
Given a protocol where the set of signal states SL con-
tains |L| complete bases. Alice and Bob announce the
basis of each signal, which partitions the POVMs MA
and MB into |L| disjoint sets mvA = {A(β,k) : β = v}
and mwB = {B(β,k) : β = w}. They decide to keep
only those events which were measured in the same ba-
sis, e.g.,those where they made the same announcement
f(x) = f(y) = u. Each set is associate with the filters
Ku = Lu =
1√|L| , (F1)
which are proportional to the identity for all u.
Let Alice and Bob share a state ρAB with a purification
|Ψ〉. Due to the particular form of the filters, it follows
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that |Ψu〉 = |Ψ〉, and that the new POVMs MuA and MuB
are only a rescaled version of the old ones
MuA = {|L| A(β,k) : β = u} (F2)
MuB = {|L| B(β,k) : β = u} (F3)
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